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Objectives: To determine adherence with recommended pre- and post-exposure oseltamivir
prophylaxis (OP) among workers exposed to poultry during five simultaneous avian influenza (AI)
H5N1 outbreaks in poultry farms in southern Israel in March 2006, as well as the efficiency of the
distribution system of oseltamivir in the community.
Design: Epidemiological investigation identified 201 workers exposed to poultry during AI out-
breaks. They were interviewed by a public health nurse regarding adherence with recommended
OP, symptoms, and possible side effects. Data were collected on type of exposure, age, sex, rate
of adherence with OP, and reasons for non-adherence. For eight workers, paired sera were drawn
for the determination of antibodies to H5. Data were collected on the efficiency of the
distribution of oseltamivir tablets to workers in the community.
Results: High adherence with OP (87.6%) was found among poultry workers during outbreaks of
AI, with no difference by type of exposure, age, or sex. There was a low rate of side effects of OP
(1.5%). No exposed workers developed AI and none of the eight who had paired sera drawn showed
seroconversion. The distribution of OP in the community was inefficient, with 27.7% of the tablets
‘lost’ or returned unusable.* Corresponding author. Tel.: +972 8 6263501; fax: +972 8 6280286.
E-mail address: ilana.belmaker@bsh.health.gov.il (I. Belmaker).
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Conclusions: These data emphasize the importance of developing efficient targeted distribution
systems in the community for OP, in order to prevent human infection during AI outbreaks.
# 2008 International Society for Infectious Diseases. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Since the first human cases caused by the avian influenza (AI)
virus A/H5N1 in Hong Kong in 1997,1 319 human cases with
192 deaths have been reported.2 World health authorities are
concerned not only with preventing disease and death caused
by avian influenza in humans, but also that mutation or re-
assortment of the virus in infected people may trigger the
spread of a new variant that may cause an influenza pan-
demic.
The World Health Organization (WHO), the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the European
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) have
recommended that persons exposed to birds infected with
the H5N1 virus be offered chemoprophylaxis with neurami-
nidase inhibitors, with monitoring and reporting of symp-
toms.3—5 National health authorities have developed
preparedness plans for mitigating outbreaks of avian influ-
enza and have stockpiled supplies of antivirals. The indis-
criminate use of antivirals, however, may lead to the
development of oseltamivir-resistant influenza strains,6 as
indicated by the increasing resistance of seasonal influenza
viruses (A/H1N1) to oseltamivir.7 The potential for the spread
of oseltamivir-resistant strains of H5N1, along with the lim-
ited world supply of oseltamivir, emphasizes the importance
of appropriate use of the drug. In order to help policy-makers
estimate the number of doses of oseltamivir they need to
stockpile to mitigate an outbreak of avian influenza, data on
adherence with recommendations for oseltamivir prophy-
laxis (OP) are essential. However, apart from a study in
Canada on adherence with OP during an outbreak of AI
H7N3 in poultry,8 we could find no study reporting adherence
with OP during outbreaks of AI H5N1.
The occurrence of five simultaneous outbreaks of AI H5N1
in large poultry farms in southern Israel in March 2006
allowed us to collect data on adherence in workers exposed
to infected poultry without the use of personal protective
equipment (PPE), who had been recommended post-expo-
sure OP, as well as in workers receiving pre-exposure pro-
phylaxis for work in culling poultry, and to analyze reasons for
non-adherence. For eight of the workers receiving post-
exposure OP, paired sera were drawn for the detection of
antibodies to AI (H5). Data were also collected on the effi-
ciency of the dissemination of oseltamivir tablets to workers
in the community. Our findings have implications for pre-
paredness programs for future outbreaks of AI, as well as for
influenza pandemics.
Methods
The first confirmed H5N1 outbreaks in southern Israel were
identified simultaneously on March 16, 2006 in two poultry
farms located 20 kilometers from each other. Laboratory
confirmation of H5N1 in poultry was established by virusisolation in specific pathogen-free (SPF) embryonated eggs
and hemagglutination tests on the allantoic fluid, after pre-
liminary identification of H5 by PCR. Three additional out-
breaks occurred in poultry farms in southern Israel between
March 16 and 31.9,10 The total number of poultry in all five
farms was 199 700.
Epidemiological investigation, data collection, outreach
by public health nurses, and follow-up of workers on poultry
farms involved in the five outbreaks in the region were
performed by the same staff of the Regional Health Depart-
ment (RHD), using identical methods for each outbreak.
The epidemiological investigation to identify potentially
exposed workers collected information on type of exposure,
estimated date of initial exposure (based on date of begin-
ning of increased mortality among the poultry and reported
dates of work on the infected poultry farm), and presence of
symptoms (cough, temperature), sex, and age. This investi-
gation identified 57 workers who had been in close contact
with poultry without the use of PPE. All were recommended
post-exposure OP, along with oral and written recommenda-
tions for self-monitoring of symptoms. In addition all 225
workers recruited to cull poultry on farms within a 3-kilo-
meter radius of infected farms had preliminary interviews in
order to ascertain that none had pre-existing symptoms or
chronic conditions; demographic data were recorded, and all
were recommended pre-exposure OP and self-monitoring of
symptoms, and were provided with PPE.
Overall, 282 workers were identified for whom the RHD
recommended OP. All workers received oral andwritten expla-
nations and a recommendation of 75 mg/day of oseltamivir
until 7 days following last exposure, self-monitoring of fever,
and immediate referral to healthcare facilities should symp-
toms appear. All workers were personally given oseltamivir
tablets by the staff of the RHD. The oseltamivir tablets were
dispensed in packages of 10 as marketed, even if the recom-
mendationwas for less than 10 days of OP, in order to save time
in thedispensation of the tablets underfield conditions.Culling
workerswhoworked for over 3 days receivedadditional tablets
as needed from the community nursing staff of the RHD.
Since foreign workers, hired by work contractors, could
not be contacted directly due to language and access bar-
riers, they were excluded from the analysis, leaving a final
study size of 201 workers of whom 40 had received a recom-
mendation for post-exposure OPand 161 for pre-exposure OP.
All 201 workers were interviewed by a public health nurse
from the RHD during follow-up site visits or by phone regard-
ing adherence with recommended OP, symptoms, and possi-
ble side effects, and they were encouraged to complete the
recommended course of prophylaxis.
Full adherence was defined as completion of the recom-
mended regimen. Subjects who did not complete this regimen
were defined as non-adherent. The independent variables
analyzed included: type of prophylaxis — post-exposure (after
close contact with poultry on infected poultry farms without
Table 1 Adherence by demographic variables and type of exposure in the study population (N = 201)
Variable Adherence n (%) p-Value
Type of exposure
Contact with infected poultry without PPEa (post-exposure prophylaxis) 32/40 (80%) 0.89
Culling poultry (pre-exposure prophylaxis) 144/161 (89.4%)
Ageb
<26 years 44/50 (88%) 0.82
26—45 years 78/80 (97.5%)
>45 years 36/39 (92.3%)
Sex
Male 174/198 (87.9%) 0.27
Female 2/3 (66.7%)
a PPE, personal protective equipment.
b Missing data on age for 32 workers.
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culling), age, and sex.
A more detailed analysis was made of the 40 workers who
received a recommendation for post-exposure OP, since they
were exposed to infected poultry. Adherence was analyzed
by interval between estimated time of initial exposure and
beginning of OP, reported side effects of OP, reasons for non-
adherence, sex, and age. According to directives from the
national offices of the Ministry of Health, the first eight
workers who received recommendations for post-exposure
OP had paired sera drawn for the detection of antibodies to
the AI virus by the microneutralization (MN) assay.11 The
initial sera were drawn before the start of OP and the paired
sera were drawn 43 days later.
Percentages of adherence were calculated in each cate-
gory, and statistical significance was calculated using the Chi-
square test or Fisher’s exact test as appropriate.
Results
Most of theworkers weremale (198/201), and themean age of
all the workers was 34.9 years (range 15—70 years). Those
receiving a recommendation for pre-exposure prophylaxis due
toworkcullingpoultrywereyounger than thosewho receiveda
recommendation for post-exposure OP prophylaxis due to ex-
posure to infected poultry without use of PPE (34.1 14.7 vs.
41.4 14.5 years, p = 0.005). All three womenwho received a
recommendation for OP were in the post-exposure group.
Overall, 176 (87.6%) adhered completely with the recom-
mended OP, while 25 out of the 201 (12.4%) did not fully
adhere. Table 1 describes adherence with OP by independent
variables. There were no significant differences in adherence
by type of exposure, age, or sex.
Among the 25 workers who did not adhere fully with the
recommended OP, five stated that they did not complete the
recommended regimen because they did not receive enough
tablets. Three workers reported possible side effects to OP,
of whom two reported muscle pain and headache, without
fever, which resolved spontaneously, and both completed the
recommended course of OP. An additional worker developed
abdominal pain after 3 days of OP and stopped the treatment
on the orders of his treating physician. He resumed OP again
after 7 days and stopped treatment one day after last contact
with infected poultry due to diarrhea and severe dizziness.Four workers chose not to take OP. No information on the
reasons for non-adherence among the other 13 workers was
recorded.
Among the 40 workers who received recommendations for
post-exposure prophylaxis due to work on infected farms
without PPE, the adherence rate was 85%, with no association
with age or sex. The workers who adhered with recommen-
dations for post-exposure OP began the prophylaxis at amean
of 3.08  1.6 days from the start of exposure. Among the six
workers receiving a recommendation for post-exposure OP
who did not adhere with the recommendation, one stopped
because of side effects of diarrhea and dizziness (described
above) and one chose not to start OP. This worker was a
government poultry supervisor who stated that he entered an
infected poultry cage for less than an hour and was in no
direct contact with the infected poultry. No information was
recorded as to the reason for non-adherence among the other
four workers.
Paired sera of eight workers in the post-exposure group
were negative for antibodies to the H5 strain of AI by MN. All
eight workers fully adhered with recommended post-expo-
sure OP.
In order to examine the efficiency of the RHD in distribut-
ing oseltamivir tablets to workers in the community, we
performed an inventory of oseltamivir at the end of the
outbreaks. We found that 72.3% of tablets that were dis-
tributed in the community were taken, 18.8% were returned
to us unused, and 8.9% were ‘lost’ (transferred from one
worker to another or from a worker to a friend or family
member, contrary to the instructions of the RHD).
No human cases of avian influenza were identified in Israel
during or after the outbreaks among poultry.
Discussion
This is one of the first studies with data on adherence with OP
among workers exposed to poultry during outbreaks of AI.
Adherence with recommended pre- and post-exposure OP
was high (87.6%) among all 201 workers who had close
contact with infected poultry or culled poultry during the
avian influenza outbreaks, with no difference by type of
exposure, age, or sex.
A previous study has been published on adherence to OP
among workers exposed to the H7N3 strain of AI in Canada,8
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workers exposed to the H5N1 strain of AI. The rate of
adherence found in our study (87.6% overall and 85% of those
exposed to infected poultry), was higher than that found
among workers in direct contact with infected poultry during
an outbreak of AI H7N3 in Canada.8 In the Canadian outbreak,
71% of workers in direct contact with infected poultry
received oseltamivir, but only 44% reported taking OP daily.
Of those entering infected barns, 74% took oseltamivir, over
80% reported that they always used gloves and masks, but
only 55% reported that they used goggles at all times. These
data on the low use of PPE among workers entering infected
barns emphasize the importance of high adherence with OP in
order to prevent human infection, as well as of programs to
encourage the proper use of PPE.
The high rates of adherence found in our study may be
related to the community outreach program of the RHD, in
which public health nurses personally contacted workers who
had received recommendations for OP. In the event of an
influenza pandemic, there will certainly not be enough staff
to implement an outreach program with individual follow-up
by public health workers.
This high rate of adherence may also be related to the
short duration of recommended OP for AI (7 days after last
exposure). In their study of HIV-positive patients in India,
Sarna et al. found that adherence to antiretroviral therapy
decreased with the duration of treatment, from 93.4% for
therapy of 4 days duration to 80% for 7 days.12 Among people
exposed to anthrax who received a recommendation for a 60-
day course of ciprofloxacin prophylaxis, adherence rates
were low and ranged from 21% to 64%.13
Only three workers (1.5%) developed potential side
effects, none of which were serious, of whom only one
stopped OP. This rate of side effects was lower than that
reported by Skowronski et al. (13% reported nausea, 12%
stomach pain, 5% diarrhea, and 5% headache).8
Despite the fact that workers exposed to infected poultry
without PPE started prophylaxis an average of 3 days from
estimated initial exposure, none became ill and all paired
sera were negative for AI antibodies. These results are not
surprising in light of the study of the 2006 outbreak of AI H5N1
in Nigeria, in which none of 295 exposed poultry workers
developed AI despite minimal use of PPE and no use of OP.14
The distribution of oseltamivir tablets to workers in the
community by the RHD resulted in a high rate of adherence
with OP, but at the cost of a high rate of inefficiency. Of the
tablets, 18.8% were returned unused and could not be re-
used since the RHD had no way of knowing the conditions
under which they had been stored by the workers. An addi-
tional 8.9% were ‘lost’ by workers transferring their supply to
other workers, friends, or family. Overall, there was a loss of
27.7% of oseltamivir tablets. Conversely, five of the 201
workers for whom OP was recommended did not adhere since
they did not receive enough tablets. An estimate of the
number of oseltamivir doses that needs to be stockpiled
for use during outbreaks of AI and influenza pandemics needs
to take into account the percentage of oseltamivir tables that
may be expected to be ‘lost’ in the distribution process,
along with measures to ensure that all who need OP receive
an adequate number of tablets.
In the outbreaks reported here, 80% of the workers
received OP for low risk exposure (culling) in accordancewith ECDC guidelines,5 but not with CDC4 and WHO3 guide-
lines. Restriction of OP to high-risk groups will markedly
decrease the number of oseltamivir doses needed for stock-
pile, with little if any increase in risk of human cases.
Restriction of OP to high-risk groups will also decrease the
risk of development of resistant avian influenza strains.15,16
The control of AI requires close cross-border9 and inter-
national cooperation, as well as careful planning by the
health authorities responsible for planning and implementing
preparedness strategies to mitigate outbreaks of AI. The data
presented here on adherence with OP, as well as the data on
the efficiency of distribution of oseltamivir tablets to workers
in the community, are useful for public health authorities in
planning for the control of future AI outbreaks, as well as for
future influenza pandemics. In a global village, with limited
supplies of neuraminidase inhibitors,17 it is critical to develop
efficient distribution systems in the field that will ensure that
neuraminidase inhibitors are distributed to those for whom
they are recommended, along with a program to encourage
adherence while minimizing loss of antivirals in limited
supply.
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